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CHAPTER 6

Contracts
FREDEllICK M. HART

§6.1. Covenants not to compete. In the 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY, at·
tention was called to the large number of cases involving covenants
not to compete.1 In that year most of the litigation pitted employer
against employee.2 During the 1964 SURVEY year two cases in which
the buyer of a business attempted to enforce a covenant not to compete are worth noting. A third case,a decided in 1962, is also included
as it provides the necessary background for one of this year's decisions.
Whether a covenant not to compete should be implied in the sale
of stock was discussed at length by the Supreme Judicial Court in
Tobin v. Cody 4 during the 1962 term. In that case a long-established
and friendly business relationship was terminated in an amicable
settlement when the defendant sold the plaintiff his stock in the corporation. After six years the defendant began a competing business:
The plaintiff-buyer brought an action to enjoin the defendant from
competing, and the Court upheld an injunction granted below.
The Court recognized the close connection between the good will
of a business and a covenant not to compete. It held that even though
the good will of a corporation belongs to the corporate entity, there are
situations in which the sale of stock by a stockholder carries with it a
transfer of the good will. The primary test of whether a covenant
not to compete should be implied is whether the covenant is necessary
to give to the purchaser what was sold to him. Among the criteria to
be considered in a particular case are the following: whether the seller
was an active participant in the business, whether he held a position
with the company that gave him the opportunity to control or affect
the good will, the number of shares outstanding, and the connection
between the name of the seller and the name of the business.
A similar case, Ca/is Auto Parts, Inc. v. Caproni,6 was decided during
the 1964 SURVEY year. The Court had little difficulty in fitting the
case into the.general mold of Tobin v. Cody. The only distinguishing
FREllEIUClt M. H.u.T is Professor of Law at Boston College Law SchooL The
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4 Ibid.
6 547 Mass. 211, 196 N.E.2d 87' (l!MK), also noted in §5.7 IU/mJ.
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factor was that in Cap's Auto Parts the circumstances surrounding the
sale of stock were distinctly unfriendly, and the settlement had an
undercurrent of bitterness. The Court did not attach any significance
to this difference, but it does seem to be of importance. When a
settlement is friendly, it may well be that the buyer reasonably assumes
that the seller will not compete with him and that the law should find
an implied-in-fact promise by the seller to that effect. When, however,
the transaction is marked by hard bargaining, it is more reasonable to
expect that the covenant not to compete would have been extracted
from the seller if this had been part of the deal. The Court in Cap's
Auto Parts did note that the seller indicated his intention to retire,
and it may be that this finding gave rise to the implication of the
covenant.
Sulmonetti v. Hayes& marks the furthest that the courts have gone
in allowing an injunction to run against strangers to a covenant not
to compete. Frank Hayes operated a fuel oil business with his father
and continued the business after his father's death. His wife Emily
actively assisted Frank in the office after the death of his father. The
business floundered, and Frank sold out to Sulmonetti, a separate
consideration of $10,000 being paid to Frank for his covenant not to
compete. Emily was not a party and may not have known of the
covenant before it was actually signed. Two years later Emily formed
an oil company under a new name. She was the sole stockholder,
president, and treasurer. Emily, even when she had worked for the
prior business, had shown considerably more business acumen and
capability than Frank. The Court found that Frank "deliberately
and will£ully" connived with Emily, although exactly what form this
"connivance" took is not indicated. On suit by the vendee to enforce
the covenant specifically the Supreme Judicial Court had no difficulty
in enjoining Frank from activity breaching his covenant, but Emily
presented a different situation.
The evidence did not bring the case within the recognizably enjoinable conduct of strangers to the covenant, such as when the vendor
uses the third person as an agent, or the third person is the vendor in
colorably altered form, or the third person induces the vendor to
breach his covenant. 7 The Supreme Judicial Court, however, rested
its affirmance of the injunction on the "deliberate and willful" connivance with Frank. Invoking the basic principle of fair dealing with
a vendee, the Coun found Emily's conduct to be in derogation of the
good will that the vendee had purchased.
§6.2. Liquidated damages. When a contract provides that a defaulting party shall pay the entire price as damages, this has the mark
of a penalty clause.1 This is especially true when the circumstances
make it impossible or impractical for the breaching party to accept
81964 Mass. Adv. Sb. 69!, 198 N.E.2d 297, al,o noted in §5.7 supra.
7 See Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901).
§6.2.
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McC.ormick, The Law of Damages §149 (1955).
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the bargained-for benefit. Daley v. ]. F. White Contracting Co.,2
decided during the 1964 SURVEY year, is an interesting variant to this
general rule.
In the Daley case the defendant agreed to take 100,000 yards of
"borrow and 611" from the plaintiff's land during a twenty-month
period and to leave the property graded. The defendant was to pay
$15,000 for this right. The contract also provided that "in the event
that ... (the defendant] has not removed the 100,000 yards~ he shall
then pay for said amount ... and be allowed an extra month to remove
it after the expiration of the agreement." The defendant removed
considerably less than the total amount of 611 to which he was entitled,
and he failed to grade the land properly.
·
The plaintiff sued for the entire purchase price plus an amount that
would compensate him for the expense of grading. The defendant
argued that to allow the plaintiff to recover the entire price would
be to enforce a penalty clause, and that he was liable only for the
difference between the contract price and the reasonable value of the
fill that he did not take. The Supreme Judicial Court held that even
if this were the proper measure of damages in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, the parties had the right to agree
as to the measure of damages provided that no penalty was involved.
The Court then held that this was not the ordinary case in which the.
loss to the plaintiff was only the difference between the contract and
market price. Here the plaintiff had given up his right to sell the
gravel to anyone else for a period of twenty months, and he had also
allowed the defendant to install and store equipment on his land for
the purpose of removing the gravel.
§6.5. Arbitration. In a case of first impression under Sections 2
and 5 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court
indicated the necessity of strict compliance with both the statute and
a contractual provision providing for the appointment of an arbitrator.
The plaintiff in Roberto Construction Co. v. Burnham-Manning Post
#1105, Veterans of Foreign Wars 2 moved that an arbitrator be appointed to determine the merits of its claim under a construction contract. The contract provided that any disputes arising under the
contract should be submitted to arbitration upon the written demand
of either party. Under the provisions of the Standard Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute of Architects, which was
incorporated into the contract, each party was to appoint one arbitrator and the two so appointed were to appoint a third.
The trial judge ordered that the parties proceed to arbitration,
and he appointed an arbitrator. In reversing, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that Section 2(a) of the Uniform Act, which gives the court
authority to order arbitration, was inapplicable since the plaintiff had
2 547 Mau. 285, 197 N.E.2d 699 (1!164).
§6.3. 1 G.L., c. 251, §§2, 3.
21964 Maa. Adv. Sh. 705, 198 N.E.2d 302.
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failed to comply with the conditions giving him a right to arbitration,
and the defendant had not refused to arbitrate the matter. The Court
also stressed the importance of Section 3 of the act which provides
that when the agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators the agreed upon method should be followed unless it fails.
Implicit in the Court's holding is the requirement that if the order
to proceed to arbitration had been proper, the parties should have
been given an opportunity to select a board of three arbitrators under
the provisions of the contract instead of being forced to accept the
one arbitrator appointed by the lower court.
§6.4. Statute of frauds: Interest in land. Each year a significant
number of cases involve the statute of frauds. Most of them are
routine. Nooe require resort to basic theory. A few, however, do
present exercise for the legal gymnast and provide an opportunity
either to broaden or to narrow the effect of the statute. One case,
First National Bank of Boston v. Fairhaven Amusement Co., 1 is
interesting or dull depending upon how its facts are read.
The defendant had orally agreed to bid at a judicial foreclosure
sale for "personal property on which the plaintiff held a chattel
mortgage and for the interest in a ten-year lease of real estate which
had been assigned to the plaintiff." The defendant repudiated its
obligations, the sale was made to a third party, and the plaintiff sued
for damages. The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds, and the
trial court directed a verdict on the ground that the contract concerned
an interest in land and was within the statute. The plaintiff's main
contention on appeal was that the statute of frauds should not apply
to a judicial sale. The Supreme Judicial Court correctly refused to
answer this argument on the ground that even if this were true, the
exception would not cover this case as the alleged contract was made
preliminarily to and not at the judicial foreclosure. A contract to
bid at a judicial sale is not itself under the supervision of the court
and is covered by the statute if within one of its sections.
The more interesting aspect of the case is obscured by the ambiguity
in the Court's description of the contract terms. It is not clear
whether the plaintiff was to transfer the lease to the defendant as a
separate transaction or whether the defendant was to bid for the lease
at the judicial sale and take the assignment from, or at least through,
the court. The more reasonable interpretation of the facts is that the
lease was to be sold by the court along with the personal property.2
If this is true the case stands for the proposition that an agreement to
bid for land at a sale is a contract for "the sale of lands ... or of any
interest in or concerning" land. In effect, the Court held that a
promise to make an offer to purchase land is the equivalent of a
"contract for sale" of land.
In view of the fact that the legislature believes that society is bene§6.4. 1 !147 Mas.,. 245, 197 N.E.2d 607 (1964), also noted in §2.3 supra.
This point is not made dearer by examination of the record or the briefs.
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fi.ted by invalidation of oral contracts for the sale of land, the C.Ourt'1
decision is correct. A promise to offer to purchase land, although
technically distinct from a contract to purchase land, seems no leas
likely to breed fraud.

